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Abstract
Adversarial attacks are known to succeed on classifiers,
but it has been an open question whether more complex vi-
sion systems are vulnerable. In this paper, we study ad-
versarial examples for vision and language models, which
incorporate natural language understanding and complex
structures such as attention, localization, and modular ar-
chitectures. In particular, we investigate attacks on a dense
captioning model and on two visual question answering
(VQA) models. Our evaluation shows that we can generate
adversarial examples with a high success rate (i.e.,> 90%)
for these models. Our work sheds new light on understand-
ing adversarial attacks on vision systems which have a lan-
guage component and shows that attention, bounding box
localization, and compositional internal structures are vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks. These observations will in-
form future work towards building effective defenses.
1. Introduction
Machine learning, especially deep learning, has achieved
great success in various application scenarios, such as im-
age classification, speech recognition, and machine trans-
lation. However, recent studies prove the existence of ad-
versarial examples for many vision-based learning models,
which may hinder the adoption of deep learning techniques
to security-sensitive applications [19, 43, 56, 65]. Most ex-
isting works consider image classification and demonstrate
that it is almost always possible to fool these models to clas-
sify an adversarially generated image as a class specified by
the adversary [66]. Albeit numerous defenses have been
proposed [19, 60, 52, 67, 51, 48], almost all of them are
later shown to be broken [8, 23, 9].
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in whether
adversarial examples are practical enough to attack more
complex vision systems [44, 45, 6]. In the latest results of
this debate, Lu et al. show that previous adversarial exam-
ples constructed to fool CNN-based classifiers cannot fool
state-of-the-art detectors [45]. We are interested in whether
other forms of localization and/or language context offer ef-
fective defense.
In this work, we extend the investigation towards more
complex models that not only include a vision component
but also a language component to deepen our understand-
ing of the practicality of adversarial examples. In particular,
we investigate two classes of systems. First, we are inter-
ested in dense captioning systems, such as DenseCap [30],
which identify regions of interest first and then generate
captions for each region. Second, we are interested in vi-
sual question answering (VQA) systems, which answer a
natural language question based on a given image input.
The state-of-the-art VQA systems typically compute atten-
tion maps based on the input and then answer the question
based on the attended image regions. Therefore, both types
of models have a localization component, and thus they are
good targets for studying whether localization can help pre-
vent adversarial attacks. Further, we explore state-of-the-art
VQA models based on Neural Modular Networks [25], and
evaluate whether such compositional architectures are also
vulnerable to adversarial attacks; in these models, a new
network architecture is instantiated for each question type,
potentially providing a buffer against attacks.
We evaluate adversarial examples against these vision
and language models. We find that in most cases, the attacks
can successfully fool the victim models despite their inter-
nal localization component via attention heatmaps or region
proposals, and/or modular structures. Our study shows that,
in an online (non-physical) setting when the attackers have
full access to the victim model including its localization
component (white-box attack), the generated adversarial ex-
amples can fool the entire model regardless of the localiza-
tion component. Therefore, our evaluation results provide
further evidence that employing a localization in combina-
tion with a classifier may not be sufficient to defend against
adversarial examples, at least in non-physical settings.
We also make the following additional contributions.
First, we develop a novel attack approach for VQA models,
which significantly outperforms the previous state-of-the-
art attacks. Second, we observe and analyze the effect of a
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language prior in attacking VQAmodels, and define a prin-
ciple which explains which adversarial examples are likely
to fail. In particular, when the target answer is not com-
patible with the question, it is difficult to find a successful
adversarial attack using existing approaches. To sum up,
our work sheds new light on understanding adversarial at-
tacks on vision and language systems and shows that atten-
tion, bounding box localization and compositional internal
structures are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. These ob-
servations will inform future work towards building effec-
tive defenses.
2. Related Work
In the following, we first review recent work on image
captioning and visual question answering. We focus on the
models that incorporate some form of localization, e.g. soft
attention or bounding box detection. We then review the
state-of-the-art methods to generate adversarial examples as
well as defense strategies against these methods.
Image Captioning Most recent image captioning ap-
proaches have an encoder-decoder architecture [11, 12, 32,
33, 50, 69]. A spatial attention mechanism for image cap-
tioning was first introduced by [73]. They explored soft at-
tention [7] as well as hard attention. Others have adopted
this idea [15, 42, 46, 76] or extended it to perform attention
over semantic concepts, or attributes [77, 79]. Recently [61]
proposed an end-to-end model which regresses a set of im-
age regions and learns to associate caption words to these
regions. Notably, [2, 12, 32] exploited object detection re-
sponses as input to the captioning system. As opposed to
image captioning of the entire image, [30] have proposed
dense captioning, which requires localization and descrip-
tion of image regions (typically bounding boxes). Some
other dense captioning approaches include [40, 74].
Visual Question Answering. Early neural models for vi-
sual question answering (VQA) were largely inspired by
image captioning approaches, e.g. relying on a CNN for im-
age encoding and a RNN for question encoding [17, 49, 62].
Inspired by [73], a large number of works have adopted an
attention mechanism for VQA [16, 47, 64, 72, 75, 80]. Se-
mantic attention has been explored by [78]. Other direc-
tions explored by recent work include Dynamic Memory
Networks (DMN) [36, 71], and dynamic parameter layers
(DPP) [55]. Recently a new line of work focused on de-
veloping more compositional approaches to VQA, namely
neural module networks [3, 4, 25, 29]. These approaches
have shown an advantage over prior work for visual ques-
tion answering which involve complex reasoning.
Adversarial Examples. Existing works on adversarial
example generation mainly focus on image classification
models. Several different approaches have been pro-
posed for generating adversarial examples, including fast
gradient-based methods [19, 43], optimization-based meth-
ods [66, 10], and others [58, 54]. In particular, Carlini
et al. [10] proposed the state-of-the-art attacks under con-
straints on L0, L2, and L∞ norms. Our work improves [10]
on both attack success rate and adversarial probability.
Another line of research studies adversarial examples
against deep neural networks for other tasks, such as recur-
rent neural networks for text processing [59, 28], deep re-
inforcement learning models for game playing [41, 26, 34],
semantic segmentation [14, 70], and object detection [24,
70]. To our best knowledge, our work is the first to study
adversarial examples against vision-language models.
While our work assumes that models are known to the
attacker, prior works demonstrate that adversarial examples
can transfer between different deep neural networks for im-
age classification [66, 19, 43, 56, 58, 53], which can be used
for black-box attacks. We briefly analyze the transferability
of VQA models in Appendix D.2.
Defense against Adversarial Examples. On the defense
side, numerous strategies have been proposed against ad-
versarial examples [19, 60, 52]. Early attempts to build a
defense using distillation [60] were soon identified as vul-
nerable [8]. Some recent proposals attempt to build a de-
tector to distinguish adversarial examples from natural im-
ages [52, 21, 18, 13]. Others study ensembles of different
models and defense strategies to see whether that helps to
increase the robustness of deep neural networks [67, 68, 51].
However, He et al. show that with the knowledge of the
detector network and the defense strategies being used, an
attacker can generate adversarial examples that can mislead
the model, while still bypassing the detector [23].
The most promising line of defense strategies is called
adversarial training [19, 37, 67, 48]. The idea is to generate
adaptive adversarial examples and train the model on them
iteratively. The latest results along the line [48] show that
such an approach can build a robust MNIST model. But the
same approach currently fails on extending to CIFAR-10.
3. Generating Targeted Adversarial Examples
In this section, we first present a generic adversarial ex-
ample generation algorithm, and then our implementations
for dense captioning models and VQA models.
3.1. Background: targeted adversarial examples
for a classification model
Consider a classification model fθ(x), where θ is the pa-
rameters and x is the input. Given a source image x, a tar-
geted adversarial example is defined as x⋆ such that
fθ(x
⋆) = yt ∧ d(x⋆, x) ≤ B (1)
where yt is the target label, and d(x⋆, x) ≤ B says that the
distance between x and x⋆ is bounded by a constant B.
Without loss of generality, fθ(x) predicts the dimension
of the largest softmax output. We denote Jθ(x) as the soft-
max output, then a standard training algorithm typically op-
timizes the empirical loss
∑
i L(Jθ(xi), yi) with respect to
θ using a gradient decent-based approach. Existing adver-
sarial example generation algorithms leverage the fact that
Jθ(x) is differentiable, and thus solve (1) by optimizing the
following objective:
argminx⋆L(Jθ(x⋆), yt) + λd(x⋆, x) (2)
where λ > 0 is a hyper-parameter. In fact, the state-of-the-
art attack [10] approximates the solution to (2) using Adam.
3.2. Targeted adversarial examples for DenseCap
The DenseCap model [30] predicts M = 1000 regions,
ranks them based on confidence, and then generates a cap-
tion for each region. It uses a localization network, similar
to Fast R-CNN [63], for predicting regions. For each re-
gion, the model uses a CNN to compute the embedding and
then uses an RNN to generate a sequence of tokens from the
embedding to form the caption.
To train the DenseCap model, Johnson et al. include five
terms in the loss: four for training the region proposal net-
work, and the last one to train the RNN caption generator.
To fool the model to predict the wrong target caption, we
can leverage a similar process as discussed above. Note that
existing works [24, 70] have demonstrated that an object
detection/segmentation model can be fooled by adversarial
examples. In this work, we focus on generating adversarial
examples to fool the captioning module of the model, while
retaining the proposed regions unchanged.
To achieve this goal, assuming the target caption is
Ct and the ground truth regions for a source image are
{Ri}, we construct a new set of target region-caption pairs
{(Ri, Ct)}. Using these target region-caption pairs as the
new “ground truth”, we can use the DenseCap loss, with
addition of the λd(x⋆, x) term as in (2), as the new objec-
tive, and minimize it with respect to x⋆.
3.3. Targeted adversarial examples forVQAmodels
We now briefly present our novel targeted adversarial at-
tack against VQA models. More details can be found in
Appendix A. Our design is inspired by two goals: (1) maxi-
mizing the probability of the target answer, which is equiv-
alent to the confidence score of the model’s prediction; and
(2) removing the preference of adversarial examples with
smaller distance to the source image, as long as this dis-
tance is small enough (i.e., below an upper bound). Our
evaluation shows that our algorithm performs better than
the previous state-of-the-art [10].
Algorithm 1 Targeted Adversarial Generation Algorithm
against a VQA model
Input: θ, x,Q, yt, B, ǫ, λ1, λ2, η,maxitr
Output: x⋆
1 x1 ← x+ δ for δ sampled from a uniform
distribution between [−B,B];
2 for i = 1→maxitr do
3 yp ← fθ(xi, Q);
4 if yp = yt and i > 50 then
5 return xi as x⋆;
6 xi+1 ← update(xi, η,∇xξ(yp));
7 return xmaxitr+1 as x⋆;
A VQA model takes an additional natural language in-
put Q, and predicts an answer from a candidate set of K
answers. Similar to (1), a targeted adversarial example x⋆
given a question Q is defined to be a solution to:
fθ(x
⋆, Q) = yt ∧ d(x⋆, x) ≤ B (3)
We employ Algorithm 1 to generate the adversarial
example x⋆. The algorithm takes as input: model pa-
rameters θ, source image x, question Q, target answer
yt, the distance bound B, and several hyper-parameters:
ǫ, λ1, λ2, η,maxitr. This algorithm iteratively approxi-
mates the optimal solution to the following objective:
ξ(yp) = L(Jθ(x⋆, Q), yt)
+λ1 · 1(yt 6= yp) · (τ − L(Jθ(x⋆, Q), yp))
+λ2 · ReLU(d(x⋆, x)−B + ǫ) (4)
and returns the final result as output. There are two termi-
nating conditions: (1) after at least 50 iterations, if the pre-
diction matches the target, then the algorithm stops and re-
turns the current xi as output; or (2) after a maximal number
of iterations (maxitr), if the prediction still does not match
the target, the algorithm returns xmaxitr+1 as output.
We now take a closer look at (4). yp denotes the pre-
diction in each iteration. The objective (4) contains three
components. The first is the same as in (2). The second
component maximizes the difference between Jθ(x,Q) and
the prediction yp when yp is not the target yt. τ is a con-
stant, e.g., log(K), set to ensure that the second compo-
nent is always non-negative. The third component mod-
els the constraint d(x⋆, x) ≤ B in (3). ǫ is a small con-
stant set to (L(fθ(x,Q), yt)+λ1τ)/λ2 ensures that the ad-
versarial example x⋆ which optimizes (4) always satisfies
d(x⋆, x) ≤ B. By using a ReLU function, our attack no
longer minimizes the distance d(x⋆, x) if it is smaller than
B − ǫ. In practice we choose d(x, x⋆) = ||x − x⋆||2/
√
N
and set B = 20. Other hyper-parameters η,maxitr are
the learning rate and the maximal number of iterations. We
defer a formal analysis to Appendix A.
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Figure 1: Top-K accuracy on the Caption A dataset averaged across 1000 images generated with each target caption
4. Experiments With Dense Captioning
In this section, we evaluate our attacks on Dense-
Cap [30], the state-of-the-art dense captioning model.
DenseCap employs a region proposal network to first iden-
tify the bounding boxes of objects, and then generates cap-
tions for each bounding box. We obtain the pre-trained
model from their website1.
To evaluate the attack, we use Visual Genome
dataset [35], which was originally used to evaluate Dense-
Cap in [30]. For an extensive evaluation, we create the fol-
lowing three attack sets from Visual Genome:
1) Caption A.We randomly select 5 captions as the tar-
get captions and 1000 images as the source images;
2) Caption B.We randomly select 1000 captions as tar-
get captions and 5 images as source images;
3) Gold. We select 100 images where DenseCap model
generates correct captions and manually select target cap-
tions irrelevant to the images.
For each caption-image pair, we set the caption as the tar-
get, and the image as the source to generate an adversarial
example. To evaluate the attack effectiveness, we measure
the percentage of top-K predictions from generated adver-
sarial examples that match the target captions. We consider
two metrics to determine caption matching:
1) Exact-match. The two captions are identical.
2) METEOR> ω. The METEOR score [38] between
the two captions is above a threshold ω. We consider the
threshold ω to be 0.15, 0.2, or 0.25, similar to [30].
Formally, we measure Accµ,K(x⋆, Ct) =∑K
i=1 µ(C
t, Ci)/K where Ct is the target caption,
x⋆ is the adversarial example, Ci for i = 1, ...,K are the
top-K predictions for x⋆, and µ is the matching metric (i.e.,
Exact-match or METEOR> ω).
4.1. Results and Observations
The evaluation results on Caption A are presented in
Figure 1. Each subfigure shows the results for one target
caption. For each caption and each K ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, we
1https://github.com/jcjohnson/densecap
compute Accµ,K for each of the 1000 randomly selected
images, and report the average value ofAccµ,K across 1000
images. Each plot contains such 5 top-K accuracy values
for each metric described above (see the legend).
We observe that using the metric derived fromMETEOR
score, the accuracy is higher than using the Exact-match
metric. This is intuitive, since Exact-match is an over-
conservative metric, which may treat a semantically correct
caption as a wrong answer. In contrast, using METEOR
score as the metric can mitigate this issue. Even with Exact-
match, we observe that all captions have an average top-K
accuracy above 30%. Further, for target captions Caption 1-
3, the top-1 accuracy is always above 50%. That means, at
least 500 generated adversarial examples can successfully
fool the DenseCap system to produce the exact target cap-
tions with the highest confidence score.
We further investigate the number of attack “failures”
among caption-image pairs in Caption A. The attack fails
if none of the top-5 predictions matches the target based
on METEOR> 0.15. We find only 17 such caption-image
pairs, i.e., 0.35% of the entire set, which lead to adversarial
attack failure. This means that for the rest 99.65% caption-
image pairs, the attacks are successful in the sense that there
exists at least one prediction for each adversarial example
that matches the target caption. The 17 cases can be found
in Appendix B.
The results on Caption B set are similar, and we ob-
serve that 97.24% of the caption-image pairs can be suc-
cessfully fooled in the sense described above. For the Gold
set we find that our attack fails only on one image. Due to
space limitations, we defer detailed results on Caption B
and Gold sets to Appendix B.
Note that the attack does not achieve a 100% success
rate. We attribute it to two reasons: (1) it is challenging
to train an RNN-based caption generation model to gener-
ate the exactly matching captions; and (2) the DenseCap
network involves randomness, and thus may not produce
the same results for all runs. Still, we observe that the at-
tack success rate is over 97%, and thus we conclude that the
DenseCap model can be fooled by adversarial examples.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 2: Adversarial examples generated from different images with the target caption to be “a window on a building”.
(a) head of a person (b) the plate is white (c) the water is calm (d) a key on a keyboard (e) this is an outside scene
Figure 3: Adversarial examples generated from Image 4 with different target captions (shown as sub-figure captions).
4.2. Qualitative Study
We conduct qualitative study to investigate the generated
adversarial examples and their predictions. In Figure 2, we
present five adversarial examples generated for the same tar-
get caption. We see that most of the predicted captions ex-
actly match the target (e.g., all top-5 predictions for Fig-
ure 2a and Figure 2b), or be semantically equivalent to the
target (e.g., the top-2 prediction for Figure 2e). We further
examine the bounding boxes of the regions proposed by the
model. We find that the model localizes objects in the adver-
sarial examples, although the caption generation module of
the model is completely fooled. For example, in Figure 2c,
the model can successfully identify the plates, but label all
of them as “a window on a building”.
To further understand this effect, in Figure 3, we show
the adversarial examples generated from the same source
image but with different target captions. We observe that all
adversarial images look identical to each other, and the re-
gions proposed for different images are also similar. For ex-
ample, we observe that the top proposed regions for the first
four images all circumscribe the tree on the left. However,
the top captions generated for this region are all different,
and match the target captions very well.
5. Experiments with VQA
In this section, we evaluate the previous state-of-the-art
attack [10] and our novel algorithm on two VQA models.
We also investigate the effect of adversarial attacks on atten-
tion maps of the VQA models to gain more insights about
the way the attacks work. Finally, we analyze the successes
and failures of our attacks with respect to language prior.
More results on qualitative study, transferability, and fur-
ther investigations to the failure cases can be found in Ap-
pendix D and E.
5.1. Models
We experiment with two state-of-the-art models for
open-ended visual question answering, namely the MCB
model [16], which is the winner of the VQA challenge in
2016, and the compositional model N2NMN [25]. Both
models achieve similar performance on the VQA bench-
mark [5], while being very different in terms of internal
structures. MCB relies on a single monolithic network
architecture for all questions, while N2NMN dynamically
predicts a network layout for every given question. In our
experiments we investigate whether such compositional dy-
namic architecture is more resilient than the monolithic one.
We retrieve the pre-trained model of MCB from their
website2, and the pre-trained model of N2NMN by con-
tacting the authors through email directly. The code imple-
menting N2NMN is acquired from the website.3 Notice that
the MCB model is trained not only on the VQA dataset but
2https://github.com/akirafukui/vqa-mcb
3https://github.com/ronghanghu/n2nmn
MCB, ours
N2NMN, ours
N2NMN, carlini
MCB, carlini
Figure 4: CDF of adversarial probability on the Gold set.
also on the Visual Genome dataset [35], while the N2NMN
model only considers the VQA dataset.
5.2. Datasets
To evaluate different adversarial example generation al-
gorithms we derive three datasets from the VQA dataset [5].
In particular, we choose source images and question-answer
targets from the VQA validation set as follows:
1) VQA-A: We randomly select 6,000 question-answer
pairs and 5 source images to constitute 30,000 triples;
2) VQA-B: We randomly select 5,000 source images and
10 question-answer pairs to construct 50,000 triples;
3) Gold: We manually select 100 triples, such that MCB
and N2NMN models can correctly answer the questions
based on the images, and the target answers are plausible
for the questions but incorrect for the images.
For each triple of question-answer-image, we generate
an adversarial example close to the source image using the
answer as the target. More details can be found in Ap-
pendix C.
5.3. Evaluation metrics
Given a set of question-answer pairs (Q, yt) and the gen-
erated adversarial examples {x⋆}, we evaluate two metrics:
the attack success rate and the adversarial probability.
Attack success rate. The attack is considered successful if
fθ(x
⋆, Q) = yt. The attack success rate is computed as the
percentage of successful attacks over all triples in a dataset.
Adversarial probability. The adversarial probability is
computed as Jθ(x⋆, Q)yt , where J(·, ·)i indicates the i-th
dimension of the softmax output. Adversarial probability
indicates the confidence score of the model to predict the
target answer yt, and thus provides a fine-grained metric.
5.4. Results
Here we report the overall success of adversarial attacks
on VQA models, and also compare our new algorithm de-
scribed above with the performance of the previous attack
algorithm (CW [10]) applied to this novel VQA setting. We
present the quantitative results below, and defer more qual-
itative results to Appendix D.1.
Image # 1 2 3 4 5
MCB ours 94.67 94.78 94.97 95.02 95.15CW [10] 94.10 94.28 94.27 94.52 94.78
N2NMN ours 94.25 94.53 95.57 95.80 96.15CW [10] 93.82 93.78 95.02 95.08 95.37
Table 1: Attack success rate (%) on VQA-A.
MCB, ours
N2NMN, ours
N2NMN, carlini
MCB, carlini
Figure 5: CDF of adversarial probability on VQA-A.
Gold. For both MCB and N2NMN models, we achieve
100% attack success rate using either approach. Note that
both models can correctly answer all the questions on the
original source images. The 100% attack success rate for
both VQA models shows that both of them are vulnerable
to targeted adversarial examples.
We inspect the adversarial probabilities of the generated
adversarial examples, and plot the Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) in Figure 4. Note that a lower CDF curve
indicates a higher probability in general. From the figure we
observe that the CDF curve of N2NMN is above MCB’s, in-
dicating that N2NMN is slightly more resilient than MCB.
However, we also observe that for both models, almost in
all cases the adversarial probability is above 0.7. Thus, we
conclude that our attack is very successful at misleading the
VQA models to predict the target answers. We also observe
that the CDF curve of CW attack is much higher than ours,
showing that our approach is more effective at achieving a
high adversarial probability. Overall, we show that such at-
tacks can be performed very successfully for target answers
that are meaningful to questions.
VQA-A.We further investigate VQA adversarial examples
across a wide range of target question-answer pairs. We
separately compute the attack success rate using each im-
age as the source. The results are presented in Table 1, and
the corresponding CDF curves are plotted in Figure 5. We
can draw similar conclusions as for the Gold set: (1) the
attack success rate is high, i.e., > 90%; (2) the adversarial
probability of our attack is high; and (3) our attack is more
effective than CW attack.
We observe that the attack’s performance against
N2NMN model is worse than against MCB. In particular,
from Figure 5, we see that the adversarial probability of at-
Original image
Benign attention maps Adversarial attention maps
MCB Attention N2NMN Attention MCB Attention N2NMN Attention
What is the man holding? Original answer: racket Target: phone
What does this sign say? Original answer: stop Target: one way
What type of vehicle is this? Original answer: train Target: bus
Table 2: Attention maps of benign and adversarial images on MCB and N2NMN models.
tacks generated on the N2NMNmodel is significantly lower
than the MCB model. This further shows that N2NMN
model is somewhat more robust against adversarial attacks.
We also observe that the attack success rate with respect to
different images does not vary too much. We hypothesize
that the attack success is not sensitive to a source image,
but more dependent on a target question-answer pair. Our
further investigations on VQA-B and language priors below
provide more evidence to confirm this hypothesis.
The attack success rate is not 100%, which shows that
there exist a few question-answer pairs where neither ours
nor the CW attack can succeed. In fact, for these question-
answer pairs, we have also tried other attack methods and
none of them can succeed in fooling the victim VQAmodel.
We find that these question-answer pairs tend to appear in-
frequently in the training set, and this observation leads to
our hypothesis regarding language prior. We present more
analysis of the language prior in the following section.
VQA-B.We test the hypothesis that the attack success rate
is not strongly dependent on the choice of source images us-
ing the VQA-B dataset. In our evaluation, we observe that
for 9 out of 10 question-answer pairs, the adversarial exam-
ples generated from any of the 5,000 source images fool the
victim model with 100% attack success rate. For the one
remaining question-answer pair, however, we cannot gener-
ate successful adversarial examples from any of the source
images. This result further confirms our hypothesis. Inter-
estingly, we observe that the “hard” question-answer pairs
for the two VQA models are different. For the MCB model,
the question is “Why is the girl standing in the middle of
the room with an object in each hand?” with the target
answer “playing wii”; for the N2NMN model, the ques-
tion and answer are “Who manufactured this plane?” and
“japan”, respectively. This suggests that the hard question-
answer pairs are model-specific, which further motivates us
to investigate language prior in VQA models.
5.5. Adversarial examples fool attentionmechanism
We conduct a qualitative study to gain more insights as to
how the attack succeeds. In the following we use the Gold
dataset. In particular, both models in our experiments have
attention mechanism. That is, to answer a question, a model
first computes an attention map, which is a weight distri-
bution over local features extracted from a CNN based on
the image and the question. Intuitively, a well-performing
model should put more weight, i.e. attend to, the image
region that is most informative to answer the question.
We demonstrate the attention heatmaps for three source
images and their adversarial counterparts in Table 2. We ob-
serve that the adversarial examples mislead the VQA mod-
els to ignore the regions that support the correct answer to
the question. For example, in the second source image both
MCB and N2NMN focus on the stop sign when answer-
ing the question. The adversarial examples fool MCB and
N2NMN to pay attention to the street sign instead, which
leads to predicting a one-way traffic sign, likely because
both signs are long rectangular metal plates. In the last ex-
ample, the attention is mislead to ignore the rail tracks but
focusing on the windows which look similar to those on a
bus. Therefore, we observe that adversarial examples can
fool both the attention and the classification component of
the VQA models to achieve the malicious goal.
5.6. Language Prior
We illustrate the language prior phenomenon in Fig-
ure 6. It provides an example which cannot be successfully
attacked by any algorithm in our evaluation. We show an
adversarial example generated by our attack algorithm, and
the top-5 predictions from the MCB model. Clearly, the
model is confused about the image and the question. The
answer with the highest probability only has a probability
of less than 5%. Although the model is confused, it cannot
be fooled to predict the target answer “partly” to the ques-
tion “what animal is next to the man?”. This observation
is different than those reported in the literature [66], i.e.,
that targeted adversarial examples can always be success-
fully generated against an image classifier regardless of the
image and the target label. We believe that the observed
phenomenon is due to the internal mechanism of a VQA
model which learns to process natural language questions
and predict semantically relevant answers.
In all previous experiments we choose question-answer
pairs from the VQA validation set, and thus the answers are
likely meaningful to the questions. To evaluate the effect of
language prior we construct the Non-Sense dataset. Specif-
ically, we choose question-answer pairs, such that answers
do not match the questions semantically, as they belong to
questions of a different type (e.g. “what color” vs. “how
many”). We find that the attack success rates using our ap-
proach against MCB and N2NMN are only 7.8% and 4.6%
respectively; the corresponding numbers for CW attack are
even lower, 6.8% and 3.8%. This experiment further con-
firms the significance of the language prior.
Prior work has noted the effect of language prior, i.e. that
the VQA models capture the training data biases and tend
to predict the most frequent answers [1, 20, 27, 31]. We
find that N2NMN is more influenced by language prior than
MCB. Specifically, N2NMN produces a smaller number of
distinct answers, predicting question-relevant answers inde-
pendent of image content. This may explain why it is more
difficult to achieve a high probability on some targets with
N2NMN than with MCB.We include more results and anal-
ysis in Appendix E.
Source image Adversarial example
Rank Answer Probability
1 yes 0.042
2 middle 0.041
3 on wall 0.040
4 left 0.031
5 background 0.025
Figure 6: The effect of language prior. The target question /
answer are “What animal is next to the man?”/“partly”. We
show the top-5 predictions from MCB after the attack.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we study adversarial attacks against vi-
sion and language models, specifically, dense captioning
and visual question answering models. The models in our
study are more complex than previously studied image clas-
sification models, in the sense that they contain language
generation component, localization, attention mechanism,
and/or compositional internal structures. Our investigation
shows that (1) we can generate targeted adversarial exam-
ples against all victim models in our study with a high
success rate (i.e., > 90%); and (2) the attacks can ei-
ther retain the localization output or also fool the attention
heatmaps to fool the victim model. While studying attacks
on VQA models, as additional contributions, we propose a
better attack method than the previous state-of-the-art ap-
proach. Also, we observe and evaluate the effect of lan-
guage prior that may explain which question-answer pairs
represent harder targets. Our work sheds new light on un-
derstanding adversarial attacks on complex vision and lan-
guage systems, and these observations will inform future
directions towards building effective defenses.
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A. Implementation details of improved attacks
to VQA models
In this appendix, we detail our attack strategy against
VQA models, which is briefly sketched in Section 3.3. We
first provide in A.1 the full background setup and some ter-
minology, as well as a formal definition of targeted adver-
sarial examples for VQA models. Then, we present the at-
tack details in A.2 and A.3 using the terminology defined
in A.1. In A.4, we will explain other implementation de-
tails, such as hyperparameter values, used in our evaluation.
In the end, we provide some proofs to the theoretical analy-
sis behind our technique in A.5.
A.1. Targeted adversarial examples for VQA
We denote a VQA model as fθ(I,Q), where θ is the pa-
rameters of the model, I is the input image, and Q is the
input question. The output fθ(I,Q) is the predicted answer
to the question Q given the image I .
Most existing VQA models consider this task as a clas-
sification problem. That is, they choose the most probable
answer among the top-K most frequent answers in the train-
ing set (or both training and testing set). Typically, state-of-
the-art VQA models useK = 3000.
We consider that the target to a VQA model fθ is a
question-answer pair (Qtarget, Atarget), and a targeted ad-
versarial example is an image Iadv such that
fθ(I
adv, Qtarget) = Atarget s.t. d(Iadv, Iori) ≤ B
where we refer to Iori as the benign image.
A neural network-based VQA model fθ can also be rep-
resented as fθ(I,Q) = argmaxiJθ(I,Q), where Jθ(I,Q)
outputs a K-dimensional vector in which each dimension
indicates the probability of corresponding choice to be the
predicted answer. Therefore, we can generate adversarial
examples by solving the following optimization problem
argminIadvL(Jθ(Iadv, Qtarget), Atarget) (5)
s.t. d(Iadv, Iori) ≤ B (6)
where Iori is a benign image, and the goal is to find an ad-
versarial example Iadv that is close to Iori. Typically, L is
chosen as the same loss function for training the model, but
other alternatives which are monotonic to the training loss
can also be used. In particular, Carlini et al. show that the
choice of different loss functions has a significant impact on
the attack success rate [10], when the attacks are evaluated
on MNIST dataset [39]. In this work, we consider L to be
the cross-entropy loss, which is equivalent to the best loss
function used in [10].
A.2. Solving the optimization problem
In our attack method, we approximate the optimization
problem using an alternative objective function (4). We re-
state it below using the notation defined in A.1:
ξ(Apredict) = L(Jθ(x,Qtarget), Atarget)
+λ1 · 1(Atarget 6= Apredict)
·(τ − L(Jθ(x,Qtarget), Apredict))
+λ2 · ReLU(d(x, Iori)−B + ǫ) (7)
In this formula, we use x to represent the image. Thus
the adversarial example is the value of x that minimizes the
objective (7). This objective has three components. The first
component, L(Jθ(x,Qtarget), Atarget), is the same as ob-
jective (5). The latter two are the innovations in this work,
and we elaborate their design in the following.
The second component. The second component is
λ1·1(Atarget 6= Apredict)·(τ−L(Jθ(x,Qtarget), Apredict))
Here the hyperparameter λ1 is used to balance this com-
ponent and others, and Apredict is the prediction of the
original image. The value of Apredict is set dynamically
during the iterative optimization process, so that each iter-
ation may choose a different value of Apredict. We will
explain this process in more details in the next subsection.
We set τ to be a constant, e.g., log(K) when L is cho-
sen as the cross-entropy loss. This constant guarantees
the second term is always non-negative, especially when
1(Atarget 6= Apredict). In fact, we have the following
theorem:
Theorem 1. Assuming τ = logK, where K is the num-
ber of output classes, L is the cross-entropy loss, i.e.,
L(u, i) = − log ui, the last layer of J is a softmax operator,
and Apredict is the prediction of the model over input im-
age x and question Qtarget, i.e., argmaxiJθ(x,Q
target),
then we have
1(Atarget 6= Apredict)
·(τ − L(Jθ(x,Qtarget), Apredict)) ≥ 0 (8)
To understand how this component works, we consider
two possible cases. First, in the case Apredict = Atarget,
the image generated in the last iteration is already an ad-
versarial example, and thus this component is 0 since
1(Atarget 6= Apredict) = 0. In this case, optimizing ob-
jective (7) is equivalent to maximizing the probability of
predicting the target answer Atarget.
Second, when Apredict 6= Atarget, minimiz-
ing the second component is essentially maximizing
L(Jθ(x,Qtarget), Apredict), which is equivalent to min-
imizing the probability of the model to predict Apredict,
which is different from the target answer Atarget. As for
Algorithm 2 Targeted Adversarial Generation Algorithm
Input: θ, Iori, Qtarget, Atarget, B, ǫ, λ1, λ2, η,maxitr
Output: Iadv
1 I1 ← Iori + δ for δ sampled from a uniform
distribution between [−B,B];
2 for i = 1→maxitr do
3 Apredict = fθ(Ii, Qtarget);
4 if Apredict = Atarget and i > 50 then
5 return Ii
6 Ii+1 ← update(Ii, η,∇xξ(Apredict));
7 return Imaxitr+1
the value of the hyperparameter λ1, which is used to bal-
ance between this component and others, we find that set-
ting λ1 = 1 works well in most cases. Notice that in this
case, jointly optimizing the first and the second component
is equivalent to optimizing the best loss function used in
Carlini’s attack.
The third component. The third component is set to
enforce the constraint (6). In particular, ReLU(x) =
max(0, x) is the rectifier function, and ǫ is a small pos-
itive hyper-parameter that we will explain later. When
d(Iadv, Iori) ≤ B − ǫ < B, i.e., constraint (6) is satis-
fied, the third component is 0, and thus has no effective on
the objective. On the other hand, if an adversarial exam-
ple Iadv does not satisfy constraint (6), we show that it is
never optimal for (7) when λ2ǫ is large enough. We have
the following theorem:
Theorem 2. When λ2ǫ > L(fθ(Iori, Qtarget), Atarget)+
λ1τ , the solution Iadv minimizing the objective (7) satisfies
constraint (6) as well.
In practice, we can set ǫ to be a small value (e.g., 2), and
set λ2 to be a large value (e.g., 10), then the generated ad-
versarial examples end up not activating the ReLU function
(i.e., the output of the function is 0). Even when the ReLU
function is activated, its value is not larger than ǫ, and thus
the constraint (6) is still satisfied.
Notice that in most previous iterative optimization-based
approaches [10, 43], optimizing (5) while satisfying con-
straint (6) is converted into a joint optimization problem of
L(...) + λd(...), which minimizes both the lost function (5)
and the distance function d(Iadv, Iori). The most promi-
nent difference is that our approach does not minimize this
distance as long as it is within the bound B.
A.3. Putting everything together
The overall adversarial generation method is presented
in Algorithm 1 (see the main paper). We restate the algo-
rithm in Algorithm 2 using the notation defined in A.1, and
explain the details below.
This algorithm takes the hyper-parameters defined
above, along with η, representing the learning rate, and
maxitr, representing the maximal number iterations that
the algorithm runs. In the algorithm, I1 is initialized with a
random starting point satisfying constraint (6) (line 1). Then
the algorithm iteratively updates Ii (lines 2-6). In each iter-
ation, the prediction Apredict is first computed (line 3). If
this prediction already matches the target, and the algorithm
has run for at least 50 iterations, the algorithm stops and
returns Ii as a successful adversarial example (lines 4-5).
Here, 50 is a hyperparameter that can be further tuned. In
this work, we fix it to be 50 in all experiments. On the other
hand, if the algorithm does not stop at line 5, then Ii+1 will
be updated based on the gradient ∇xξ(Apredict) and the
learning rate η (line 6). Here, update can be any optimiza-
tion algorithm. We evaluated the algorithm’s performance
by using SGD, Adam, or RMSProp, and found that Adam
always yields the best attack success rate. Therefore, we
use Adam as the update function through out this work. In
the end, if it does not return at line 5 during some iteration,
then the algorithm fails at finding an adversarial example,
and it returns Imaxitr+1 as a result. In our evaluation, we
set η = 1.0 andmaxitr = 1000 for evaluation.
Note that Carlini et al. [10] also suggest running the op-
timization algorithm multiple times with different random
starting points (i.e., line 1) to avoid local optima. We em-
ploy the same trick and pick the best adversarial example
generated among different executions of Algorithm 1 as the
final result.
A.4. Adversarial example generation algorithms
details
In our evaluation, we examine both attack methods, i.e.
Carlini et al. [10] and our proposed algorithm. For Carlini’s
attack, we choose to minimize the loss function:
ReLU(L(Jθ(x,Qtarget), Apredict)
− L(Jθ(x,Qtarget), Atarget)) + λd(x, Iori)
where x = 255 × (tanh(δ) + 1)/2 to simulate the boxed
constraint that each pixel value can only take value from
[0, 255]. This approach is demonstrated to be the most ef-
fective one in [10]. Here λ is chosen to be 0.1 by a grid
search.
For our approach, as we discussed in Section 3, we
choose the values of hyper-parameters as follows: ǫ =
2, λ1 = 1, λ2 = 10, η = 1.0,maxitr = 1000. Note that
these hyper-parameters are set based on each image being
represented as a vector of pixel values from [0, 255].
When we generate adversarial examples, we employ the
RMSE distance function as used in [43]. In particular, as-
suming there are two N -dimensional vectors x1, x2, then
the RMSE between the two vectors is computed as
RMSE(x1, x2) =
√
||x1 − x2||22/N = ||x1 − x2||2/
√
N
where || · ||2 denotes the L2-norm of a vector. Further, in
all experiments, the bound on the distance B = 20. In our
experiments, the average distance for generated adversarial
examples is below 10. We demonstrate several adversarial
examples in Section ?? to illustrate that the generated adver-
sarial examples are visually similar to their benign counter-
parts.
A.5. Proofs to the theorems
We now present the formal proofs to Theorem 1 and The-
orem A.2 presented in A.2.
Proof of Theorem 1. We consider two cases between the
relationship between Atarget and Apredict. First, when
Atarget = Apredict, the left-hand side of (8) is 0, and thus
(8) is trivially true.
Second, when Atarget 6= Apredict, then the left-hand
side of (8) becomes
τ − L(Jθ(x,Qtarget), Apredict)
Thus proving (8) is equivalent to prove
L(Jθ(x,Qtarget), Apredict) ≤ τ = logK
We prove this by contradiction. Assuming
L(Jθ(x,Qtarget), Apredict) > logK, then we have
− log Jθ(x,Qtarget)Apredict > logK
and thus
Jθ(x,Q
target)Apredict < 1/K
By definition, we have
Apredict = argmaxiJθ(x,Q
target)i
thus we know
∀i ∈ {1, ...,K}.Jθ(x,Qtarget)i < 1/K
Therefore, we know that
K∑
i=1
Jθ(x,Q
target)i < K × (1/K) = 1
However, we assume the last layer of J is a softmax layer,
and thus we have
K∑
i=1
Jθ(x,Q
target)i = 1
which is a contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that The-
orem 1 is true.
Proof of Theorem A.2. We prove this by contradiction. We
assume an adversarial example Iadv = I⋆ does not satisfy
(6), but optimizes (7). In this case, d(Iadv, Iori) > B >
B−ǫ, and thus the ReLU function is activated and its output
must be greater than ǫ. Thus, the third component is at least
λ2ǫ. Since the other two components are also non-negative,
therefore, the objective of (7) is at least λ2ǫ as well. On the
other hand, we can set Iadv = Iori, so that the value of ob-
jective (7) is at most L(fθ(Iori, Qtarget), Atarget) + λ1τ .
Since λ2ǫ > L(fθ(Iori, Qtarget), Atarget)+λ1τ , we have
that setting Iadv = Iori results in a lower value of objective
(7) than Iadv = I⋆, which contradicts the assumption!
B. Further evaluation on DenseCap
We present the top-K accuracy results for Caption B in
Figure 7. The 17 failed adversarial examples of Caption A
are presented in Figure 9. We omit the 148 failed adversarial
examples of Caption B due to size limitation.
We also report the top-K accuracy results for our Gold
set in Figure 8.
C. VQA attack dataset construction details
We construct multiple attack datasets in our experiments.
Each dataset contains a set of (I,Q,A) triples, where I
is a benign image, and (Q,A) is a target question-answer
pair. We explain how these triples are selected in different
datasets below.
Gold. For this dataset, we manually create triples where
the target question is meaningful to the image, and the tar-
get answer is incorrect to the question and image pairs. To
achieve this goal, we randomly select 100 images. For each
of them, we manually choose questions that are meaning-
ful to the image, while both MCB and N2NMN models can
answer correctly the questions based on the image. If none
of such questions exist for an image, we replace it with an-
other randomly selected image. We repeat this process until
we get 100 question-image pairs where both models predict
correct answers. Then, for each question-image pair, we
manually choose an answer that makes sense for the ques-
tion but is incorrect in the context of the image. In the end,
we have 100 (I,Q,A) triples that constitute the Gold set.
VQA-A. This dataset is designed to be a combination of
two sub-datasets, i.e., Popular-QA and Rare-QA. These
two aim at evaluating the resilience of the two VQA models
against adversarial examples with different target question-
answer pairs.
For the Popular-QA dataset, we select 3,000 popular
question-answer pairs. In particular, we first remove all an-
swers appearing less than 3 times along with their questions
in the VQA training set. This is because we observe that
among these least frequent answers, many are simply typos,
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Figure 7: Top-K accuracy on the Caption B dataset averaged across 5 images generated with each target caption
1 2 3 4 5
K
0
25
50
75
100
To
p-
K 
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
METEOR > 0.15
METEOR > 0.2
METEOR > 0.25
Exact-match
Figure 8: The result for adversarial attack against DenseCap
model on the Gold set.
(e.g., spelling “kitchen” as “kitten”). Therefore, we remove
them from consideration.
We consider the top-1000 most frequent questions in the
remaining set as popular. Further, for each popular ques-
tion, we choose its top-3 most frequent answers and con-
sider each corresponding question-answer pair as popular.
To ensure each question has at least 3 answers, we also re-
move all questions with less than 3 answers before selecting
the top-1000 most frequent questions.
We are interested in the popular question-answer pairs,
because they appear more frequently in the training set, and
thus the models may more likely remember these question-
answer pairs. Therefore, we hypothesize that it is more
likely to successfully generate an adversarial example with
such a target for an irrelevant image. We create this dataset
to test this hypothesis.
We also randomly select 5 images, which are provided
in the top raw of Figure 11. For each question-answer pair
(Q,A) and each image I , we add the triple (I,Q,A) to the
Popular-QA set. In the end, there are 15,000 triples in this
dataset.
The second dataset, i.e., Rare-QA, is similar to Popular-
QA, but the question-answer pairs are rare. In particular,
we filter out the answers appearing less than 3 times, and
all questions with less than 3 remaining answers in the same
way as during construction of Popular-QA.
Among the remaining questions, we select the top-1000
least frequent ones, and for each of them, we select the three
Popular question-answer pairs
QA1 What room is this? bathroom
QA2 What sport is this? baseball
QA3 What is the man doing? skateboarding
QA4 What is the man holding? frisbee
QA5 Is it raining? no
Rare question-answer pairs
QA1 What vegetable can be seen? carrot
QA2 What is the fence covered with? net
QA3 What does the blue signs represent? handicap
QA4
Why is the girl standing in the
middle of the room with an object playing wii
in each hand?
QA5 Who manufactured this plane? japan
Table 3: The question-answer pairs used in Scale-Image,
popular (top) and rare (bottom).
least frequent answers. We consider the question-answer
pairs selected by such criteria as rare, and in the end, we
have 3,000 rare question-answer pairs. We use the same 5
images as in Popular-QA, and generate a triple using each
question-answer pair and each image to construct 15,000
triples which constitute Rare-QA.
In doing so, we can evaluate the resilience of the two
VQA models against adversarial examples on both popular
question-answer pairs and rare question-answer pairs.
VQA-B. This dataset is similar to VQA-A, but is designed
to evaluate the adversarial generation algorithm’s perfor-
mance across different benign images. To this end, we ran-
domly select five popular question-answer pairs and five
rare question-answer pairs, listed in Table 3, as well as
5,000 images to construct 50,000 triples in total. These
triples constitute Scale-Image.
D. More Results on Experiments with VQA
We present the CDF curves of adversarial examples
generated using both our approach and Carlini’s approach
Figure 9: 17 failing adversarial examples generated from Caption A. For all these examples, the target caption is “white
clouds in blue sky”.
against MCB and N2NMN from the five images used in
VQA-A, but we separately plot the analysis for Popular-
QA and Rare-QA. For each combination of attack-model-
dataset, we plot five curves on the same figure. The re-
sults are presented in Figure 10. The results show that for
the same specification, the CDF curves for different images
are close to each other. This shows that the attack perfor-
mance is less dependent on images and more on the QA
targets. We also see that the Rare-QA targets are more dif-
ficult than Popular-QA targets, and that our attack achieves
higher probabilities that the Carlini’s attack.
D.1. Qualitative study
Figure 11 presents some qualitative examples from our
experiments on the Rare-QA pairs. We provide both benign
images and adversarial examples generated against MCB
and N2NMN. We observe that it is hard to distinguish the
benign images from adversarial ones visually.
We show the highest predictions of both VQA models
on the benign images (top) and on the adversarial examples
generated for the target QA pairs (bottom). We show targets
in “[]” and highlight the failed attacks in italics. First, we
note that even for the questions irrelevant to the images, ini-
tially, both VQA models can make reasonable predictions.
We then review the models’ behavior on the adversarial
examples. We observe that the MCB model is more fre-
quently fooled by the adversaries than the N2NMN model,
for instance in the case of the first question. For the second
question both models predict “left” instead of the target “to
left”, so essentially the attack succeeds, but it is counted as
a failure case. Therefore, our quantitative results provide
an over-conservative estimation on the attack success rate.
Finally, for the third question all the attacks fail, and top
predictions such as “yes” indicate the models’ confusion.
Interestingly, N2NMN model predicts “military” instead of
“navy” for Image 2, which can also be counted as a success.
D.2. Transferability Discussion
In this work, we focus on white-box adversarial exam-
ples, which means that the generation of these adversar-
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(a) CDF on adversarial probability of adversarial examples gener-
ated by our approach against MCB on Popular-QA.
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(b) CDF on adversarial probability of adversarial examples gener-
ated by Carlini’s approach against MCB on Popular-QA.
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(c) CDF on adversarial probability of adversarial examples gener-
ated by our approach against N2NMN on Popular-QA.
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(d) CDF on adversarial probability of adversarial examples gener-
ated by Carlini’s approach against N2NMN on Popular-QA.
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(e) CDF on adversarial probability of adversarial examples gener-
ated by our approach against MCB on Rare-QA.
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(f) CDF on adversarial probability of adversarial examples gener-
ated by Carlini’s approach against MCB on Rare-QA.
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(g) CDF on adversarial probability of adversarial examples gener-
ated by our approach against N2NMN on Rare-QA.
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(h) CDF on adversarial probability of adversarial examples gener-
ated by Carlini’s approach against N2NMN on Rare-QA.
Figure 10: More CDF figures
ial examples requires full knowledge of the model archi-
tectures. However, we also demonstrate that an adversary
could likely generate black-box adversarial examples with-
out such knowledge. This is possible due to the transfer-
ability of adversarial examples, i.e., their ability to transfer
between different network architectures [43, 53, 56, 66].
Previous work demonstrates transferability between: (1)
two models with the same architecture trained on different
Predictions on the benign images
Image 1 Image 2 Image 3 Image 4 Image 5
What are the people there for?
MCB: baseball flying kites airplane tennis elephants
N2NMN: baseball kites flying tennis parade
Where is the boy’s shadow?
MCB: ground ground plane court ground
N2NMN: ground kite sky tennis court ground
Why is the man wearing a head covering?
MCB: protection safety safety tennis protection
N2NMN: protection flying kite safety sweat shade
Predictions on the adversarial examples
What are the people there for? [festival]
MCB: festival festival festival festival festival
N2NMN: parade parade parade parade festival
Where is the boy’s shadow? [to left]
MCB: left left left left left
N2NMN: left left left left left
Why is the man wearing a head covering? [navy]
MCB: yes yes safety yes costume
N2NMN: yes military yes yes yes
Figure 11: MCB and N2NMN’s predictions on benign and adversarial images and QA pairs from Rare-QA. The target
answer is provided in “[]” along with the question. The text in italics indicates that the targeted adversarial examples do not
mislead the model to produce the exact target answer.
training data; (2) two models with different architectures
trained on the same training data; and (3) even a neural net-
work model and a non-neural network model (e.g., kNN,
SVM). Most previous work demonstrates transferability of
non-targeted adversarial examples. In [43], Liu et al. fur-
ther demonstrate that almost none of targeted adversarial
examples generated for one model transfer to another one,
and developed a novel approach to generate targeted adver-
sarial examples for an ensemble of multiple state-of-the-art
classification models to achieve better transferability.
The transferability of adversarial examples enables the
adversary to generate black-box adversarial examples from
a white-box adversary. To do so, the adversary can simply
generate adversarial examples against a white-box model
that performs the same task as the black-box model, and
these adversarial examples would transfer to the black-box
model with a high probability. Papernot et al. show that they
can effectively generate non-targeted black-box adversarial
examples against black-box online machine learning sys-
tems hosted by Amazon, Google and MetaMind [57, 56].
Further, Liu et al. demonstrate successful non-targeted
and targeted black-box adversarial examples against Clar-
ifai.com, which is a commercial company providing state-
of-the-art image classification services [43].
Again, all these previous work only study image classi-
fication models. In this work, we are interested in the trans-
ferability of targeted adversarial examples between vision-
language models, which we show below.
Experiment Results. We test the transferability of the gen-
erated adversarial examples between MCB and N2NMN.
We use the Gold set to generate adversarial examples for
this evaluation. We find that 79 out of 100 adversarial exam-
ples generated for the MCB model can transfer to N2NMN,
while the number is 60 in the other direction. This shows
that adversarial examples on VQAmodels can transfer well,
and thus opens the door for black-box attacks.
Notice that in existing work [43], Liu et al. demonstrate
that it is non-trivial to generate transferable targeted adver-
sarial examples from a single image classification model.
We note that both MCB and N2NMN employ the same pre-
trained ResNet-152 features [22] as their image representa-
tion. Thus, we attribute the good transferability results to
the use of ResNet-152 in both models.
E. Analysis on Hard Targets for Generating
Adversarial Examples
While we observe that adversarial examples can be gen-
erated for most target question-answer pairs, in some cases
the adversarial generation algorithm fails. We notice that
whether the attack will succeed or not depends on the tar-
get question-answer pair rather than on the benign image.
In this section, we investigate the failure cases and provide
some insights into why some targeted attacks may be hard.
E.1. The effectiveness of language priors
As we have observed in the experimental results de-
scribed in Section 5 (in the main paper), whether a question-
answer pair is a hard target depends more on the question-
answer pair itself and less on the image. Therefore, we hy-
pothesize that the language component in the VQA models
may prevent adversarial examples to fool the models with
certain targets. This phenomenon can be considered the lan-
guage prior of VQA models. That is, given a question, if
the model is less likely to predict a certain answer, we are
also less likely to successfully generate targeted adversarial
examples using it as the target answer.
In this section, we evaluate this phenomenon to verify
our hypothesis. In particular, we choose a question, “What
sport is this?”. We first evaluate the answer frequency as
follows. We run the VQA model on each of the 5,000 im-
ages in the VQA validation set and the selected question
to get 5,000 answers. We compute the frequency of each
answer in this set.
Intuitively, the answer frequency is a Monte-Carlo sim-
ulation of the answer distribution of the VQA model, and
our goal is to examine the relationship between the answer
distribution and the success of using an answer as the tar-
get to generate adversarial examples. In particular, we want
to show that the answer frequency is positively correlated
with the adversarial probability for each answer. To this
end, we sequentially set each answer as the target answer,
while setting the question chosen above (i.e., “what sport is
this”) as the target question, and Image 1 in Figure 11 as
the benign image. Then we compute the adversarial prob-
ability of each answer. We sort all the answers in the de-
scending order of their adversarial probabilities, and jointly
plot the adversarial probabilities and the answer frequen-
cies. Figures 12a and 12b show the corresponding plots
for MCB and N2NMN. In these plots, each point in the x-
axis indicates a label of an answer, so that the answer with
the highest adversarial probability is labeled as 0, and so
on. The blue line plots the adversarial probability of all an-
swers, while the red dots plot the answer frequency. We
only plot the answers whose frequency is at least 1, namely
the answers must appear in the model’s prediction set.
From both figures, we can observe a clear relationship
between the answer frequency and the adversarial probabil-
ity. That is, all answers with a frequency of 1 and higher can
be predicted with a large probability (e.g., > 0.1), and all
these answers can be used as targets to generate adversarial
examples. Further, we observe that the answer frequency
loosely aligns with the adversarial probability. This obser-
vation supports our hypothesis that the answer frequency is
positively correlated with the adversarial probability.
Further, we observe that N2NMN has fewer answers
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Figure 12: Answer frequency versus adversarial probability. Figure 12a and Figure 12b show that the answer frequency
is positively correlated with the adversarial probability on MCB and N2NMN respectively. Figure 12c shows the answer
frequency of the MCB model and the N2NMN model.
with a positive frequency. We illustrate this phenomenon
in Figure 12c. In this figure, we sort all answers in the de-
scending order of their frequencies based on the N2NMN
model, and the x-axis corresponds to their rank. The blue
plot shows the distribution of the answer frequency com-
puted based on the N2NMN model, while the orange dots
are each answer’s frequency computed based on the MCB
model. We can observe that many answers have a large
frequency based on the MCB model, but their frequency
based on the N2NMNmodel is 0. Therefore, combined with
the observation above, this demonstrates that the N2NMN
model has a smaller range of answers that can be used as
the target to generate adversarial examples than the MCB
model.
Notice that all these answers are generated based on the
same questions. We investigate the results, and find that
many of the answers predicted by theMCBmodel are irrele-
vant to the question used in this evaluation. This shows that,
since N2NMN composes the network modules according to
the input question, it is more effective at constructing corre-
sponding filter modules, which can eliminate the answers
irrelevant to the question. On the other hand, the MCB
model does not have this functionality, since its architecture
is identical throughout all questions. Therefore, when an
image is less relevant to the question, the MCB model may
predict answers considering the image more than the ques-
tion. In this sense, the answer set of N2NMN is smaller than
the one of MCB, since the former only includes answers rel-
evant to the question. This also indicates that N2NMN has a
stronger language prior than MCB, which partially explains
why N2NMN behaves slightly more resilient than MCB in
our previous experiments.
E.2. Meaningless question-answer targets
We further evaluate the effect of language prior by con-
structing a dataset of meaningless question-answer targets.
We select 100 questions from 5 categories starting with
(1) “What color”; (2) “What animal”; (3) “Is”; (4) “How
many”; and (5) “Where”. Then we construct the set of
meaningful answers to each type of questions: for example,
“silver” is a meaningful answer to a “what color” question.
In doing so, the answer assigned to one type of question
is guaranteed to be meaningless to the questions in another
type. Thus we choose a meaningless answer for each of the
100 questions. We use them as targets and the 5 images used
in Popular-QA and Rare-QA as the benign images to gen-
erate the adversarial examples. In the end, we observe that
the attack success rates using our approach against MCB
and N2NMN are only 7.8% and 4.6% respectively; the cor-
responding numbers for Carlini’s attack are 6.8% and 3.8%
respectively. This experiment further confirms the signif-
icance of the language prior and again demonstrates that
N2NMN is more resilient against adversarial examples than
MCB.
